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Trade with China: A Policy for the 21st Century
Remarks of Senator Max Baucus
Business Coalition on US-China Trade
Washington, D.C.
April 10, 1997
Good morning. Today I will make the second in a series of three speeches on our
relations with China. Last month I spoke on peace and security. I will continue next month with
environmental policy, and today I will address our economic and trade agenda.
I began with peace and security simply because if we don't have peace, everything else
tends to fade into the background. And I concluded that in security relations with China, we are
on reasonably firm ground. We are at peace. We have strong alliances in the Pacific. We have
the domestic strength to support the world's best military. And while we face difficult issues,
from Korea to the Taiwan Strait, our policies are sound. If we are firm, fair and patient, we can
keep the peace for years to come.
As we look toward the 21st century, trade is a bit of a contrast. Here our results are poor
and our policies need a lot of work. And that work needs to be done soon -- because if we are
able to keep the peace, nothing in our relations with China will mean more to jobs, prosperity
and daily life in America than trade. And to explain why, before we dive into the details of
tariffs, copyrights and , export financing, let me step back and look at the broader context.
GROWING IMPORTANCE OF TRADE
Start with the obvious -- trade is growing fast. When I graduated from high school,
imports and exports made up about a fifteenth of the economy. When I came to Congress in
1975, it was about an eighth. Today it is a third -- $835 billion in exports, $949 billion in
imports -- and rising each year.
If you live in Montana, you see it every day. We're selling more beef to Japan than ever
before; but also importing more live cattle from Canada. One year a Japanese semiconductor
firm comes to Butte, the next a Missoula golf bag maker moves to China. Trade affects more
jobs, more farms and more families every day.
And in the next decade these trends will accelerate. Uruguay Round market access and
investment agreements will phase in. Big countries shut out of world trade in the Cold War --
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Vietnam -- will join the world economy. Developing countries
will export and import more each year.
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And our policy hasn't kept up. On the positive side, the U.S. Trade Representative has
the right strategic agenda and capable staff. The Commerce and Agriculture Departments, and
our senior political officials, work hard to promote our products. We are tougher on foreign trade
barriers, copyrights and so on than we were during the Cold War. And on imports, our anti-
dumping and countervailing duty laws are in good shape.
But we often fail to monitor and enforce the agreements we reach. The American
Chamber of Commerce in Japan, for example, found a few months ago that we do not even have
a list of our trade agreements with Japan. We use unilateral trade sanctions far too often -- the
National Association of Manufacturers counts sixty-one instances since 1993, or more than one
a month. We restrict exports more severely than any other country. And we are far behind most
of our trade rivals in export promotion and financing.
In sum, our policies are deeply confused, and the result is predictable. We export far less
than we should. Our trade deficit hit $120 billion last year. The public is losing faith in trade
policy, and with some reason.
So we need to match our negotiating strategy with equally good export promotion. *Cut
back on unilateral sanctions. Get even tougher on trade barriers. Commit ourselves to bring our
trade into balance. And nowhere is the task more urgent than in China.
GREAT EXPECTATIONS ...
Our modem trade relationship with China really dates to 1980, when we signed our
commercial agreement and granted MFN status. Since then, our bilateral trade with China has
risen at an astonishing pace. It was about $4 billion then; it may top $70 billion this year.
American companies invested nearly $12 billion in China in the past three years. Newspapers
are full of headlines advertising new deals and new opportunities.
And the future offers a dazzling prospect. Only India matches China as a potential export
market. China has a population of 1.2 billion, and is already among the world's four largest
economies. It has a growing middle class -- 300 million Chinese consumers already live in the
cities and more come every day. And it is the fastest-growing big economy on earth.
A walk down the street in almost any Chinese city gives you the sense of limitless energy
and growth. Every visitor to China comes back talking of the construction cranes dotting the
skylines. Shiny new cars running on newly paved streets past newly erected billboards. Cellular
phones. Stock exchanges. Farmers strapping color TVs to the back of their new motor scooters.
So we have great expectations. And rightly so. Our exports in everything from
telecommunications to computers, environmental technology, autos and agriculture ought to be
booming. But when you look at the figures, you find it isn't so.
POOR RESULTS
China's potential as an export market has always been great. Back in 1776, Adam Smith
wrote that China had a market "not much inferior to the market of all the different countries of
Europe put together." American business took him very seriously; our first Yankee clipper,
optimistically christened Empress of China, landed two years after the British surrender at
Yorktown.
The result was our first trade deficit -- we sold a boatload of ginseng and bought a much
more valuable cargo of silk, tea and porcelain. From then to World War II, despite all the color
and excitement of the China trade, China was a minor market. It took at most 2% of our exports
-- the same fraction it takes today. Reality never matched potential.
And the same is true today. Last year, the Commerce Department reported $12 billion
in U.S. goods exports to China. With re-exports through Hong Kong, it may be $18 billion.
That's up from about $2 billion in 1980. It sounds impressive. But actually it is pretty feeble.
In the short term, exports to China are flat. $11.7 billion in 1995, $12.0 billion in 1996.
Thus, according to the Commerce figures, China was our 12th largest export market in 1993.
It had fallen to 15th by last year. And if you add Hong Kong, the total is bigger but the trend
is actually worse.
And in the long run, despite the headlines, things are no better. Since 1980, as our
exports to China grew by $15 billion, our exports to the EU grew by about $70 billion. To Japan
by $50 billion. And to the ASEAN countries by about $30 billion. In each case the gap is
widening, not closing.
A SOLUTION IN THREE PARTS
So reality is miles behind the "China boom" hype. And at least in terms of exports -- and
that's what a Member of Congress has to think about most -- the trends show no signs of
improvement. So I conclude that without some big changes, the China market may never reach
its potential. And the future could be one of rapidly increasing imports, flat exports, rapidly
growing trade disputes, and ultimate disillusion.
But I am not a pessimist or a historical determinist. We can and will do much better.
And I see a solution in three parts.
First, fix our own mistakes.
Second, take down Chinese trade barriers and end structural biases against imports through
a sound World Trade Organization agreement.
And third, put the whole thing on a stable foundation by making MFN status permanent.
SELF-INFLICTED WOUNDS ...
Let's start with the self-inflicted wounds. Statistics show that Japanese, European and
Asian exports to China are growing much faster than ours. And that's because some of the broad
failings of our trade policy -- weak export promotion, too frequent resort to unilateral sanctions
and so forth -- are at their worst in China.
We won't let our trade promotion agencies -- OPIC, TDA, the Asian Environmental
Partnership, sometimes the Ex-Im Bank -- help us sell to China. We restrict technology exports
more tightly than anybody else, for example by refusing to sell nuclear power plants when
Guangdong Province alone will buy twelve in the next decade. We have an anti-proliferation law
that embargoes electronics exports if China sells missiles -- that is, if China misbehaves we
sanction ourselves.
This won't work. We cannot block export promotion; sanction our own companies; vote
on cutting off.all trade with China each year; and then expect a good trade balance. If we are
serious about trade with China, we should eliminate the sanctions. Change our missile sale law
so it hits proliferators instead of US exporters. And bring our export controls in line with the
rest of the world, or bring them in line with us.
... AND CHINESE POLICIES
But that won't be enough. Because as bad as our own mistakes may be, structural
economic issues and deliberate Chinese trade barriers do much more to cut our exports.
Look at China's economy today. The economic reforms of the past twenty years
abolished Mao's rural communes, state-assigned careers and ban on private business. They raised
tens of millions of people from poverty. We should applaud them; but we should also realize
they have not made China a market economy. Instead, as the Chinese say, they created
"socialism with Chinese characteristics."
State-owned enterprises -- that is, about 100,000 factories and service providers operated
by the government -- make up nearly half the economy and employ two thirds of all urban
workers.
Subsidies are so pervasive as to be almost an irrelevant term when government officials,
their relatives, and ministries themselves are in business. And prices reflect the real cost of labor
and material inputs, as St. Paul puts it, "through a glass darkly."
Neither has reform created a rule of law which would let even half-developed markets
work.
The government routinely tells foreign firms in China which inputs they can import, what
they must buy from Chinese sources, and to whom they can sell.
Confracts are uncertain; the famous Beijing McDonald's incident, in which the city tried
to evict the restaurant when a Hong Kong company offered a better building lease, is an example.
Import decisions are often as much political as economic, when the government uses
contract decisions on everything from grain to aircraft to publicly "punish" American companies
for problems in broader US-China relations.
And trade barriers, from familiar tariff, quota and agricultural issues to species as unique
to China as the giant panda, are everywhere.
THE WTO: NO DEAL BETTER THAN A BAD DEAL
Up to now we have used laws like Section 301 to fight the most flagrant abuses, along
with defending our workers from dumping and subsidies through the anti-dumping and
-countervailing duty statutes. It won some results, especially on copyright piracy. But it is slow
and frustrating, and it does little to address the structural issues of a semi-reformed communist
economy. If we hope to make trade fair, we need a much better, much more comprehensive,
approach to Chinese trade barriers.
And we have it at hand in China's application to enter the World Trade Organization.
The WTO already has rules on virtually all the problems we have in China trade -- everything
from tariffs and quotas to subsidies and distribution. And if we get a good agreement, we may
see results very quickly.
But we should remember that these talks come with risks. If we sign a bad agreement
with lots of loopholes and exemptions, whatever we miss will stay there a long time. If we
accept a bad deal, we should never expect much from the China market.
And to digress a bit, the consequences would go beyond China to other reforming
communist countries. Russia, with its strong base in primary commodities, heavy industry and
aerospace, hopes to enter the WTO next year. Further on are Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other
newly independent nations. Then Vietnam, a nation of 80 million and already a foreign
investment magnet. China's WTO accession will define the terms under which nearly a third of
the world's people and industry conduct international trade. So we need to be firm and patient
and hold out for a good deal.
WHAT IS A GOOD DEAL?
That raises an obvious question. What would a good deal be?
Essentially, since 1980 we have offered China a new Open Door policy on trade. And
a good WTO deal would open the door in both directions. In the next century, we would find
it just as easy to export and do business in China as Chinese find it here. And if that is to be the
outcome, we need four things from China.
First, market access.
Second, fair rules and laws.
Third, safeguards against subsidies and dumping.
Fourth, results and enforcement.
MARKET ACCESS
Let us begin with market access. Today's tariffs rise to 120% for a Land Cruiser and
80% on a pound of beef. They must go way down. We need to see much less restrictive quotas,
particularly on agriculture. Abolition of unscientific barriers to farm products, like the charge
that Pacific Northwest wheat is contaminated with a fungus called "TCK smut." An end to all
unpublished quotas and regulations. And abolition of the bizarre rules which make life miserable
for importers -- for example, the Health Ministry's rule requiring safety inspections on all
imported musical instruments.
We must open China's market to services like insurance, banks, law firms, air cargo and
passenger flights, entertainment, and civil engineering. These industries make up a third of our
exports to the world, but less than a tenth of our exports to China. A fair accession will mean
vast new sales for Americans and a higher quality of life for Chinese, who now have to deal with
inefficient state monopolies in almost every service sector.
And all this must be done fast. China has argued for special "developing country"
treatment which would phase in market access commitments over many years. That would be
a mistake. China should be able to call itself whatever it wants, but special treatment is
inappropriate for China and -- I believe -- outdated for all but the very poorest countries in any
case.
LEGAL REFORMS AND NATIONAL TREATMENT
Second, rules. Ministries and local governments must not be able to extort money or
ignore national laws and customs rules. Tariffs, inspections and quotas must be the same in every
port and province. Law enforcement must enforce our right to protect copyrights, patents,
trademarks and semiconductor designs.
China's restrictions on national treatment must be abolished completely. The government
must abandon policies requiring investors to export all or part of their production rather than
selling it to Chinese. There should be no required middlemen or restrictions on trading rights.
Anyone who wants to sell grain to China must be able to sell straight to the mill without a
government permit. Just as important, but often ignored, Chinese citizens who want to buy must
be able to buy without a permit.
And technology transfer requirements must be outlawed. People who invent new
manufacturing processes, software or machines must not have to turn them over in order to do
business in China.
DUMPING AND SUBSIDIES
Third, subsidies. We need clear and visible separation between ministries, officials and
public taxes on one hand, and private business on the other. Exporters must not be pitted against
quasi-public, quasi-private companies which get endless revenue from the Chinese public.
Likewise, effective safeguards against export subsidies and dumping. In all the reforming
communist countries, price mechanisms are weak and the cost of inputs far below their real value.
Our anti-dumping law addresses this with special rules that calculate dumping from non-market
economies. This is the right policy given the present state of economic reform in China, and we
need to keep it in place.
RESULTS AND ENFORCEMENT
Fourth, results and enforcement. China's central government has the theoretical and actual
power to control all decisions. But China is so big that the central government can only
concentrate on a few priorities at one time, giving local and provincial governments almost
unchecked authority over everything else.
It is quite conceivable that China's commitments, even when made in good faith, might
not come through in reality because of recalcitrance on the part of ministries, provinces or local
governments. So we ought to have some benchmarks to measure success, including objective
measures of Chinese imports, and a pre-arranged system of consultation if we see things going
wrong. And when problems arise, we must be ready to enforce our rights.
PERMANENT MFN STATUS
Of course, a good WTO accession works in both directions. And that brings me to the
third part of a new China trade strategy.
From the founding of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs after World War II,
to the WTO today, we have accepted one basic commitment with no exceptions. That is MFN
tariffs for all members, permanently and without conditions. If China agrees to a commercially
acceptable WTO protocol, the Chinese have the right to expect us to fulfill this commitment to
them. It was the foundation of Secretary of State Hay's Open Door Policy in 1900, and it should
be the foundation of a New Open Door policy today.
It is good policy on the merits. And if China accepts a fair WTO deal, it is also the fair
and honorable thing for us to do.
So I-will soon introduce a short, simple bill to make MFN permanent. Passing it will be
no easy task. If China will not make an acceptable WTO offer, I doubt the Administration will
support it. And, of course, if China is not careful, anything from fundraising scandals to troubles
in Hong Kong could stop Congress from passing it regardless of the Administration's position.
But if we get a good WTO deal, I will push this as hard as I can.
CONCLUSION
Let me then sum up.
The next decade, we know, will see a vast expansion of trade. It will touch nearly every
American, from Montana farmers to Hollywood actresses, dock workers and chip designers. If
our trade policy remains as inconsistent and contradictory as it is today, it may be an unsettling
or even frightening epoch of job insecurity and growing resentment of foreigners. But if we get
it right, these years can be the most prosperous and exciting in our history.
And there is no better place to start than in China. The world's largest country. Its
fastest-growing major economy. The source of our largest trade deficit. And with all our present
difficulty -- with all the realism born of past disappointment -- still the market with the greatest
potential on earth.
We need to match our negotiating strategy with a commitment to enforcement and export
promotion. We need tough, patient work at the WTO talks. And we need to lay the foundation
for it all with permanent MFN status. When we do it, we'll have something to be proud of.
Thank you all very much, and let's get to work.
